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A Novel, Nonobvious Approach to 
Curb Abusive Patent Litigants 
Zachary H. Valentine* 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine the following scenario: A young innovator sits in his 
basement, meticulously coding podcasting software that, in his 
opinion, will change the course of the industry.  The innovator 
tirelessly perfects the invention after work during the week, 
eventually to the point where he wants to patent his new 
invention and reap the rewards of his relentless labor.  The young 
innovator files with the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office, receives a patent, and opens up an online retailer to sell his 
software.  A few years later, after the software has seen new 
updates and has graduated into retail stores and large e-
commerce sites, the innovator receives a cease and desist letter 
from a company that he has never heard of in essence stating that 
his software infringes on a patent that covers a “system for 
disseminating media content representing episodes in a serialized 
sequence,”1 and further threatens a patent infringement lawsuit if 
 
 * Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law, 
2016; B.S. in Biology, Salve Regina University, 2011.  I would like to thank 
my family for providing me with a continuing source of inspiration.  I also 
want to thank Scott DePasquale for his thoughtful conversations about 
patent trolls, which ultimately resulted in my writing this Comment.    
1. U.S. Patent No. 8,112,504, at [54] (filed Mar. 4, 2009) (issued Feb. 8, 
2012).  This patent was eventually invalidated after being challenged by the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”) before the Patent Trial and Appeal 
Board, but not before plaintiff Personal Audio extorted famous podcaster 
Adam Carolla into settling for an unknown sum, and also walked away with 
a $1.3 million jury verdict against CBS.  See Elec. Frontier Found. v. Pers. 
Audio, No. IPR2014-00070, No. 41 at 29 (P.T.A.B. April 10, 2014); Joe Mullin, 
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he refuses to shell out $100,000. 
Unfortunately, this hypothetical innovator has encountered 
one of the biggest problems currently stifling innovation.2  Patent 
trolls, or “patent assertion entities”—to be politically correct—are 
patent holders that, in one way or another, obtain patents merely 
to generate money through litigation rather than utilizing their 
exclusive patent rights to create something new or practice the 
field of art.3  These patent trolls hunt small businesses and large 
corporations alike by using egregious tactics to manipulate 
inventors into abandoning their hard work and extort individuals 
and organizations into paying licensing fees.4  Their modus 
operandi is straightforward, although it differs depending on the 
size of their prey.  Patent trolls often hunt large corporations in 
open court via infringement lawsuits.5  Although one would think 
that the justice system would be a fair battleground, the diligent 
patent trolls forum shop, seeking inconvenient courts with rocket-
docket schedules, plaintiff-friendly verdicts, troll-friendly judges, 
and jurors of limited education and technological sophistication.6  
However, when the trolls approach smaller prey, they do so with 
their hands under their trench coats—by sending threatening 
letters to mom-and-pop businesses via certified mail.7  To date, 
patent trolls have ultimately been able to weasel away with over a 
half trillion dollars in wealth that could be going towards other 
areas of the economy.8 
 
Infamous “Podcasting Patent” Knocked Out, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 10, 2015, 
6:00 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/04/infamous-podcasting-
patent-knocked-out-in-patent-office-challenge/. 
 2.  See WILLIAM J. WATKINS, JR., PATENT TROLLS: PREDATORY LITIGATION 
AND THE SMOTHERING OF INNOVATION 2 (2013). 
 3.  Id. at 11. 
 4.  Patricia S. Abril & Robert Plant, The Patent Holder’s Dilemma: Buy, 
Sell, or Troll?, COMMC’NS. ACM., Jan. 2007, at 36, 43. 
 5.  See, e.g., Jeremiah Chan & Matthew Fawcett, Footsteps of the Patent 
Troll, 10 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 1, 2 (2005). 
 6.  See WATKINS, supra note 2, at 30–32. 
 7.  See, e.g., Daryl Lim, Standard Essential Patents, Trolls, and the 
Smartphone Wars: Triangulating the End Game, 119. PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 82–
83 (2014) (“PAEs have also targeted end users such as retailers using Wi-Fi 
equipment instead of implementers who make the equipment.  Earlier in 
2011, one PAE, Innovatio, sent more than 8000 letters to hotels, coffee shops, 
and restaurants who used technology by Cisco and Motorola, alleging patent 
infringement.”). 
 8.  WATKINS, supra note 2, at 16.   
VALENTINEFINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/4/2016  8:57 PM 
120 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 21:118 
This issue is all but unrecognized on a nationwide scale: in 
the current legal field, “[p]atent trolling is at the top of legislative 
and regulatory reform agendas at many levels.”9  Congress, the 
White House, state legislatures, and private entities have all tried 
their hands at remedying the nuisance.10  Additionally, the 
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has been scrutinizing patent 
abusers to weed out questionable practices,11 and the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) has made several 
efforts12 to increase patent quality.13  While most efforts have 
been lackluster in terms of curbing the abusive tactics of patent 
assertion entities, the most effective bulwark thus far has been 
the United States Supreme Court.14  In 2014 alone, the Court 
accepted seven patent-centric writs of certiorari—resulting in six 
 
 9.  Robin Feldman & W. Nicholson Price II, Patent Trolling: Why Bio & 
Pharmaceuticals Are at Risk, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 773, 774 (2014). 
 10.  See, e.g., STRONG Patents Act of 2015, S. 632, 114th Cong. (2015); 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4195–4199 (2014); EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION (2013), https://www.whitehouse. 
gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf; Sarah Mitroff, Mark Cuban’s 
‘Chair to Eliminate Stupid Patents’ Just Got Filled, WIRED (Dec. 20, 2012, 
6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2012/12/eff-patent-donation/.  See also 
Richard Mannella & Julie A. Hopkins, Patrolling the Patent Trolls: Ongoing 
Developments in US IP Law, ACC DOCKET, Dec. 2014, at 78, 80, available at 
http://us.practicallaw.com/4-590-9225 (follow “Click to download PDF” 
hyperlink). 
 11.  See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: 
ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION (Mar. 2011), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/evolving-ip-market 
place-aligning-patent-notice-and-remedies-competition-report-federal-trade/ 
110307patentreport.pdf; see also 15 U.S.C. § 46(b) (2006) (empowering the 
FTC to conduct sweeping economic studies of business practices, including 
patent assertion practices). 
 12.  See, e.g., Request for Comments on Enhancing Patent Quality, 80 
Fed. Reg. 6475, 6477 (proposed Feb. 5, 2015) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 
1). 
 13.  See Feldman & Price, supra note 9, at 774–75. 
 14.  See, e.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2352 (2014) 
(holding that process patents directed at an abstract idea ineligible subject 
matter unless the process amounts to substantially more than the abstract 
idea; applying an abstract idea with a form of technology does not meet this 
standard); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 137 (2007) 
(holding that a licensee need not breach a licensing agreement in a 
declaratory judgment for non-validity); eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 
U.S. 388, 394 (2006) (requiring patent holders seeking permanent injunctive 
relief to meet the traditional four-factor equitability test). 
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unanimous opinions15 and one 7-2 decision16—that can be read as 
a strategic effort to both close the door on patent trolls and 
discourage unmeritorious litigation.17  However, the results will 
be unsurprisingly disappointing because clever trolls can 
inherently move more quickly than the Court and will actually be 
able to take advantage of some of these decisions moving 
forward.18  While the Court is mostly setting up downstream 
barricades (i.e., trying to deter abusive patent holders from 
bringing unmeritorious claims), the lacerations in the patent 
system left as a result of the trolls cannot be remedied without 
extensive upstream blockades (i.e. not granting patent trolls 
patents to abuse in the first place).  In this sense, areas ripe for 
mending are located within the patentability inquiry: the novelty 
and nonobviousness requirements. 
This Comment begins with Part I, which introduces the 
problem of patent trolls and their history.  Part II analyzes how 
the Court has been addressing the issue of patent trolling, as well 
as its overall (in)effectiveness.  In Part III, I will predict some 
problems that may arise due to the Court’s recent efforts and will 
argue that, despite the push, patent trolls will respond by 
changing their methods to target the patentability analysis out of 
court.  Finally, Part IV will argue that, because of this predicted 
shift in patent troll behavior, narrowing the novelty and 
nonobviousness analyses through the judiciary will be the most 
effective way to mend the patent system without leaving good 
faith innovators handicapped.  By narrowing these patentability 
inquiries, the Court will not only fend off abusive patent litigation, 
but will also discourage trolls from purchasing dated patent rights 
altogether, a common troll motif.19  This approach is inherently 
the next logical step in light of recent decisions, and the results 
 
 15.  Alice, 134 S. Ct. 2347; Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 
S. Ct. 2120 (2014); Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. 
Ct. 2111 (2014); Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. 
Ct. 1749 (2014); Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 
1744 (2014); Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 
843 (2014). 
 16.  Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015). 
 17.  See Mannella & Hopkins, supra note 10, at 82, 84. 
 18.  See infra Part II.B. 
 19.  See WATKINS, supra note 2, at 13; Chan & Fawcett, supra note 5, at 
2–4. 
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will be analogous to the aftermath of the Court’s recent decision in 
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, which addressed patent 
eligibility for processes directed toward an abstract idea.20  While 
tinkering with the patentability analysis will ultimately lead to 
fewer available patents, even for even good faith innovators, it will 
reduce the number of ambiguous patents for trolls to acquire, 
thereby decreasing litigation arising from vexatious plaintiffs 
while simultaneously discouraging threats behind closed doors.  
By adhering to this method, the Court will also be able to fulfill 
the ultimate constitutional goal of the patent system: promoting 
useful arts by only rewarding truly innovative creators the powers 
of exclusivity.21 
I. TROLLING FOR DOLLARS 
Patent trolls currently present a substantial threat to the 
United States economy.22  Of all the colloquialisms, they are the 
legal equivalent of the bad apple that spoils the whole bunch.  
These individuals and entities confidently feed off the current 
system because, realistically, when the cost to defend a suit 
against a troll can range in the tens-to-hundreds-of-millions,23 it 
is more economical for a defendant to give into their shakedown 
than to pay the costs associated with civil discovery.24  
 
 20.  See 134 S. Ct. at 2352.  See also Donald Zuhn, USPTO Holds Forum 
on Interim Guidance—Part III, PAT. DOCS (Feb. 19, 2015 11:59 PM), 
http://www.patentdocs.org/2015/02/uspto-holds-forum-on-interim-guidance-
part-iii.html (“[I]n the span of ten months, the allowance rate for business 
method art units had dipped from 24% in January to 5% in July to 3% in 
October.”). 
 21.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries”). 
 22.  See WATKINS, supra note 2, at 16–17.   
 23.  See, e.g., Philip Elmer-DeWitt, How Apple Lost $533 million to an 
8th-grade dropout patent troll, FORTUNE (Feb. 27, 2015, 12:22 PM), 
http://fortune.com/2015/02/27/how-apple-lost-533-million-to-an-8th-grade-
dropout-patent-troll/ ($533 million jury verdict against Apple Inc. awarded to 
patent troll); Joe Mullin, Symantec Must Pay $17 Million to World’s Biggest 
Patent Troll, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 9, 2015, 12:09 PM), 
http://www.arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/02/symantec-must-pay-17-
million-to-worlds-biggest-patent-troll/ ($17 million verdict against Symantec 
Corp. awarded to patent troll).  
 24.  See John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. 
REV. 2111, 2129 (2007); see also Anna Mayergoyz, Comment, Lessons from 
Europe on How to Tame U.S. Patent Trolls, 42 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 241, 242–43 
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Additionally, by skirting the production of goods in commerce, 
abusive patent holders entirely obviate the Constitution’s explicit 
goals by hindering and discouraging innovation.25  By now it 
should be patently evident that these “patent trolls” are on 
Santa’s naughty list, but how did they get there in the first place? 
Although patent trolls may make one think of the old 
“Norwegian fairy tale of Three Billy Goats Gruff,” which featured 
“a troll living under [a] bridge, attacking any person or thing who 
dare[d] to cross,” in reality, patent trolls are often inanimate, 
incorporated entities.26  The “troll” denomination was coined by 
Intel Corporation’s then-assistant general counsel Peter Detkin to 
describe “somebody who tries to make a lot of money off a patent 
that they are not practicing and have no intention of practicing 
and in most cases never practiced.”27  More eloquently delineated 
as “nonpracticing entities” (“NPEs”), “patent assertion entities” 
(“PAEs”), or “patent monetizers,” these patent holders 
characteristically own patent rights but only use them to “create” 
infringement litigation.28  While these delineated categories all 
fall under the umbrella of the term “patent troll,” and are often 
used synonymously, subtle differences exist between NPEs and 
PAEs.29 
Described simply, NPEs are “entit[ies] that own[] patents, but 
do[] not manufacture or market a product.”30  Common examples 
that fall under this wide net include: (1) start-up companies that 
have not yet perfected their manufacturing processes; (2) 
 
(2009). 
 25.  Cf. Leslie T. Grab, Note, Equitable Concerns of eBay v. 
MercExchange: Did the Supreme Court Successfully Balance Patent 
Protection Against Patent Trolls?, 8 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 81, 84 (2006). 
 26.  WATKINS, supra note 2, at 11; see Chan & Fawcett, supra note 5, at 
1–3.   
 27.  Mayergoyz, supra note 24, at 245 (quoting Brenda Sandburg, 
Trolling for Dollars, RECORDER, Jul. 30, 2001, at 1); see also Peter N. Detkin, 
Leveling the Patent Playing Field, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 636, 
636 & n.3 (2007). 
 28.  WATKINS, supra note 2, at 11.  See, e.g., Chan & Fawcett, supra note 
5, at 1; Feldman & Price, supra note 9, at 773. 
 29.  For the sake of this Comment, the “patent monetizer” nomenclature 
is a mere tautology of the “PAE” nomenclature.  PAEs inherently are patent 
monetizers because they seek to capitalize on the efforts of inventors by 
purchasing patents and using them as a weapon in commerce.  See Feldman 
& Price, supra note 9, at 773–75. 
 30.  Mannella & Hopkins, supra note 10, at 77. 
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companies that once sold a product but ceased to continue; and, 
most controversially in terms of patent reform, (3) universities 
and research institutions (including their respective technology 
transfer offices).31  In the same vein, PAEs also do not 
manufacture anything, but what makes them particularly 
nefarious is their strategy to acquire extensive patent portfolios 
for the sole purpose of suing other market players for patent 
infringement.32  In this sense, PAEs can be considered more 
malicious than NPEs because they never have, are not currently, 
and most likely never will, produce anything other than adversity, 
and can be considered less trustworthy because of their tactics in 
obtaining and enforcing their patents.33  While these tactics are 
frankly genius, they have come to reek of moral turpitude when 
viewed in the historical context of patent trolling. 
A. The Patent Troll Adaptive-Evolution 
In a sense patent trolling is all but old news: people have been 
milking the patent system since this nation’s founding.34  While 
the concept of exploiting patents might be old, as time has 
progressed, trolls’ strategies have grown in complexity to keep up 
with the advancing technologies that they exploit.35  Throughout 
this evolution, however, there has been a common theme: obtain 
and hold a patent for a soon-to-be-obsolete technology that is 
broad enough to cover whatever technology inevitably takes its 
place.36 
Patents are engrained in the Constitution as a method for 
Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts, by securing 
for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive right to their . . . 
Discoveries.”37  The essential goal—promoting the evolution of 
 
 31.  See id.; see also Brian Pomper, In Considering Patent Law Changes, 
Don’t Forget Impact on Universities, IPWATCHDOG (Feb. 15, 2015), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/02/15/patent-law-changes-impact-on-
universities/. 
 32.  Mannella & Hopkins, supra note 10, at 77. 
 33.  See id. 
 34.  See generally JEFFREY H. MATSUURA, JEFFERSON VS. THE PATENT 
TROLLS: A POPULIST VISION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2008). 
 35.  See WATKINS, supra note 2, at 1–5. 
 36.  See id. at 13. 
 37.  U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 8.  Today, the term “useful Arts” is 
considered to encompass the “technological arts.”  See In re Musgrave, 431 
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technology—was thought by many of the Founders to be served 
most effectively by granting creators monopolies for a limited 
amount of time.38  Thomas Jefferson, who is at the forefront of 
patent trolling history, thought quite the opposite,39 and it was 
likely he who encountered the first patent troll.40  In these early 
days, although “[n]o one . . . was acting as a patent troll[] under 
[its] modern definition[,] . . . [t]here were, however, a growing 
number of inventors who were beginning to integrate licensing of 
rights to use patents into a deliberate commercial strategy.”41  
These early inventors would, in addition to manufacturing their 
own patented goods, license the rights to do so to other 
manufacturers in return for a royalty on the sales.42  Although, 
this is a common method of doing business for both trolls and non-
trolls, today this notion offended Jefferson, who believed that such 
a practice was “overreaching and [a] misuse of patent rights” that 
would ultimately “thwart the development of new applications and 
enhancements for existing devices and processes.”43  Although the 
Court disagreed with him when the issue arose in litigation,44 
Jefferson is notably one of the first individuals to recognize that 
patent rights, if not utilized properly, could impede the progress of 
technology.45 
Around the same time, Eli Whitney, a name every elementary 
school student in the United States recognizes as the famous 
inventor of the cotton gin, proved to be the originator (albeit not 
 
F.2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
 38.  See WATKINS, supra note 2, at 4. 
 39.  See Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 
13, 1813), in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 600–01 (Phillip B. Kurland & 
Ralph Lerner eds., 1987), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/ 
founders/print_documents/v1ch16s25.html (“It has been pretended by some, 
(and in England especially,) that inventors have a natural and exclusive right 
to their inventions . . . . Inventions cannot, in nature, be a subject of property.  
Society may give an exclusive right to the profits arising from them, as an 
encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may produce utility, but this 
may or may not be done, according to the will and convenience of the society, 
without claim or complaint from anybody.”). 
 40.  See MATSUURA, supra note 34, at 101–02. 
 41.  Id. at 101. 
 42.  See id. at 101–02. 
 43.  Id. at 102, 106. 
 44.  See Evans v. Jordan & Morehead, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 199, 202 
(1815). 
 45.  See MATSUURA, supra note 34, at 106. 
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widely recognized by the legal community) of patent trolling 
strategies and acted as an NPE by today’s standards.46  After 
successfully obtaining a patent for the cotton gin,47  Whitney’s 
manufacturing company went out of business and discontinued 
production three short years later.48  Thereafter, to monetize his 
patent, Whitney resorted to suing plantation farmers for patent 
infringement.49  Similarly, George Selden, a patent attorney who 
is commonly recognized as the first patent troll, began operating 
as a PAE under the modern definition as early as 1895.50  Selden 
“obtained a patent for automobile engine technology[,]” and 
“[t]hrough a holding company, he threatened to sue the 
automotive industry for patent infringement to obtain licensing 
fees.”51  Today, patent trolls retain this fundamental practice. 
To be successful, however, trolls need to obtain patents.  To 
meet the growing demand, “patent sharks” began brokering 
patent ownership rights to trigger-happy litigants early in patent 
troll history.52  As the technological renaissance progressed, “the 
market for patent trading and patent assertion has expanded 
dramatically,” especially as newer, more efficient products 
outcompeted once-popular technologies.53  Nowadays, some patent 
trolls target despondent companies and either offer to purchase 
their patent, or more nefariously lurk around “bankruptcy 
auctions where patents of failed technology companies are offered 
for sale . . . .  [This] ha[s] allowed many trolls to accumulate 
massive portfolios.”54 
 
 46.  See Mannella & Hopkins, supra note 10, at 78. 
 47.  U.S. Patent No. 9,957 (issued Mar. 14, 1794), available at 
http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/cotton-gin-patent/ (last visited 
Feb. 14, 2015).  The actual patent number is not actually known, but rather 
is a rough estimate.  See Julian Trubin, Eli Whitney, The Invention of the 
Cotton Gin, JULIAN TRUBIN (June 2013), http://www.juliantrubin.com/ 
bigten/whitneycottongin.html. 
 48.  See MITCHELL WILSON, AMERICAN SCIENCE AND INVENTION: A 
PICTORIAL HISTORY 80 (1954). 
 49.  See id. 
 50.  See Mannella & Hopkins, supra note 10, at 78. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  See Feldman & Price, supra note 9, at 778. 
 53.  Id.; see also WATKINS, supra note 2, at 13. 
 54.  WATKINS, supra note 2, at 13. 
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B. The Patent Troll Issue is Socially and Monetarily Expensive 
Trolls famously target software patents, business method 
patents, and patents for outdated technologies because the 
turnaround is inherently guaranteed: Business method patents 
are plentiful and large corporations continue to update their 
technologies, rendering the last generation moot.55  
Unsurprisingly, the very same corporations that are in the 
business of creating the usurping products are common targets for 
patent trolls.56  To battle these corporate behemoths, trolls have 
evolved their simple “wait and sue” strategy into one that exploits 
the judiciary and manipulates the public: forum shopping.57  
However, the forum shopping tactic utilized by trolls is not 
necessarily based in conflicts of law, as it is generally.  Trolls 
forum shop in the same way you or I would shop for groceries—in 
the same places every time.58  And, in the same way our 
supermarkets encourage us to return, these fora continue to 
graciously welcome patent troll lawsuits.59 
Generally, a troll’s primary objective is to file suit in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, “the 
American mecca of patent litigation.”60  In return, the Eastern 
District of Texas continuously hosts patent-holding plaintiffs with 
an open embrace.61  Recent statistics show that the Eastern 
District of Texas leads the nation in the number of patent suits 
filed, followed closely by the District of Delaware.62  Known trolls 
 
 55.  See Mannella & Hopkins, supra note 10, at 78; Gene Quinn, Business 
Methods by the Numbers: A Look Inside PTO Class 705, IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 
22, 2012), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/01/22/business-methods-by-the-
numbers-a-look-inside-pto-class-705/. 
 56.  See, e.g., Brian Howard, Lex Machina Releases First Annual Patent 
Litigation Year in Review, LEX MACHINA (May 13, 2014), https://lexmachina. 
com/patent-litigation-review/ (listing Apple, Amazon, AT&T, and others as 
the companies facing the highest number of new patent infringement 
lawsuits in 2014). 
 57.  See David G. Barker, Comment, Troll or No Troll? Policing Patent 
Usage with an Open Post-Grant Review, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 9, ¶ 7 
(2005), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? 
article=1129&context=dltr. 
 58.  See, e.g., Howard, supra note 56. 
 59.  See WATKINS, supra note 2, at 31–32. 
 60.  Id. at 1. 
 61.  See id. at 31–32. 
 62.  See Howard, supra note 56.  Lex Machina, a firm that analyzes 
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hold at least three of the top ten spots for the amount of patents 
asserted in court by plaintiffs, and, unsurprisingly, the most 
common defendants in these suits are large technology 
companies—Apple, Amazon, and AT&T.63  While the Delaware 
and Eastern Texas district courts are roughly tied for the amount 
of patents cases that actually go to trial, plaintiffs filing in the 
Eastern District of Texas have an astoundingly high victory rate 
in comparison, estimated in past years as high as 78%.64  The 
Eastern District of Texas is also notorious for its rocket-docket 
schedule crammed with patent infringement cases, as well as its 
propensity for lay-jury trials in these oftentimes hyper-technical 
suits.65  Patent trolls literally set up shop within the Eastern 
District’s jurisdiction to purposefully avail themselves to these 
 
patent litigation trends and other patent-relevant variables, speculates that 
patent-plaintiffs may consider the District of Delaware “as an increasingly 
friendly venue” due to the fact that a hefty portion of companies are 
headquartered in the state.  Id. 
 63.  Id.  Some critics believe that the percentage of patent-troll plaintiffs 
is closer to sixty percent:  
Of the ten plaintiffs filing the most lawsuits, all are trolls.  The most 
litigious troll last year was ArrivalStar, a company that Ars 
[Technica] first reported on in 2012 when the company started suing 
public transit agencies.  ArrivalStar, run by Vancouver resident 
Martin Jones, agreed to back away from that strategy after a US 
transit group lawyered up, but it continues to sue a vast array of 
private companies using different forms of vehicle-tracking 
technology.   
Looking at the ten most frequently asserted patents, seven of them 
are from the ArrivalStar family of patents describing vehicle-
tracking technology.  Other patents on the most-asserted list include 
ones that originated at AT&T, Xerox, and Stanford University but 
are now in the hands of various trolls. 
Joe Mullin, The Year in Patent Litigation: More Trolling, More Texas, ARS 
TECHNICA (May 14, 2014, 1:27 PM) [hereinafter 2014 in Patent Litigation], 
http://www.arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/05/the-year-in-patent-litigation-
more-trolling-more-texas/. 
 64.  See WATKINS, supra note 2, at 29 (citing Julie Blackman, Ellen 
Brickman & Corinne Brenner, East Texas Jurors and Patent Litigation, JURY 
EXPERT (March 1, 2010), http://www.thejuryexpert.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
BlackmanetalTJEMarch2010.pdf); 2014 in Patent Litigation, supra note 63. 
 65.  See WATKINS, supra note 2, at 29–31.  Some commentators suggest 
that the issue of allowing lay juries to hear patent cases is another avenue to 
reform patent law to curb patent trolling.  See, e.g., id. at 52–53; Rob Tiller, 
Another Idea for Addressing Patent Trolling: Eliminate Jury Trials, 
OPENSOURCE.COM (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.opensource.com/law/15/2/ 
patent-reform-eliminate-jury-trials. 
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benefits and manipulate the public (i.e., potential jurors) along the 
way by “masquerade[ing] as nonprofit foundations and community 
do-gooders.”66  Moreover, of all the patent cases filed in the 
Eastern District of Texas, Judge Rodney Gilstrap sees more than 
triple the amount as any other judge in the district.67 
Trolls are able to lure defendants to their favorite forum by 
exploiting federal circuit law governing specific jurisdiction.68  In 
patent infringement suits brought by troll-plaintiffs against large 
companies that deliberately market their products to consumers 
nationwide, “the jurisdictional inquiry is relatively easily 
discerned from the nature and extent of the commercialization of 
the accused products or services by the [company] in the forum” 
because “the claim both ‘arises out of’ and ‘relates to’ the 
[company’s] alleged manufacturing, using, or selling of the 
claimed invention.”69  Therefore, many infringement defendants 
that fall target to trolls will be subject to the specific jurisdiction of 
the Eastern District of Texas. 
On the other side of the coin, large companies cannot lure 
trolls away from their Eastern Texas forum.  If a large company 
were to bring an action for declaratory judgment in response to an 
infringement claim “to clear the air of infringement charges,” its 
cause of action would “neither directly arise[] out of nor relate[] to 
the making, using, offering to sell, selling, or importing of 
arguably infringing products in the forum, but instead [would] 
arise[] out of or relate[] to the activities of the [troll] in enforcing 
 
 66.  WATKINS, supra note 2, at 17; see also id. at 30–32.  
 67.  See 2014 in Patent Litigation, supra note 63, at fig. 13. 
 68.  See WATKINS, supra note 2, at 23–24.  The jurisdictional analysis in 
infringement cases is familiar; courts look to whether the claim arises out of 
activities that the defendant (e.g., a large technology company) has directed 
towards the forum.  See Breckenridge Pharm., Inc. v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 
444 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2006).  If the court answers in the affirmative, 
the court will then examine whether the jurisdictional assertion would be fair 
and reasonable for the defendant.  Id.  This places the burden on the 
defendant to ‘“present a compelling case that the presence of some other 
considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable’ under the five-factor 
test articulated in by the Supreme Court in Burger King [Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz].”  Id. (quoting 471 U.S. 462, 476–77 (1985)); see also World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (setting out a five-
factor test for analyzing specific jurisdiction inquiries). 
 69.  Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten Int’l Co., 552 F.3d 1324, 1332 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008).  
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the patent or patents in suit.”70  Thus, the jurisdictional inquiry 
shifts from one focusing on activities arising from the forum to 
activities that are related to the forum, which, for a large company 
headquartered in areas other than the Eastern District of Texas, 
is merely the receipt of a letter marked with a Marshall, Texas 
return address that alleged infringement—an activity that falls 
short of satisfying the specific jurisdiction analysis.71   
Therefore, through this jurisdictional misbalance in favor of 
troll-plaintiffs, the Eastern District of Texas acts as a black hole 
vacuuming up large prey.  When the inquiry shifts to the 
defendant, however, they can rarely assert that their forum is 
proper.72  This inherently incentivizes trolls to stay hunkered 
down in the Eastern District of Texas and encourages further 
abuse of the system.  This jurisdictional battle for the Eastern 
District of Texas is also a lose-lose scenario: (1) the troll’s target 
will not have their forum preference, and (2) defendants will likely 
lose the ultimate lawsuit due to troll-sympathetic juries.  
Moreover, the average infringement case can cost up to $4 million 
just to defend.73  Thus, it is painfully obvious that many 
companies settle with trolls in fear of a loss that could be in the 
eight-figure range.74 
From an overhead perspective, the continuous exploitation of 
the judicial system is only a prerequisite to the worst evil 
perpetrated by patent trolls—the hindering of research and 
development (“R&D”).75  Unfortunately, settlements are not the 
 
 70.  Id. (quoting Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc., 148 
F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).   
 71.  See, e.g., id. at 1333. 
 72.  See WATKINS, supra note 2, at 24. 
 73.  See AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW ASSOC., REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 
35 (2013), available at http://library.constantcontact.com/download/get/file/ 
1109295819134-177/AIPLA+2013+Survey_Press_Summary+pages.pdf. 
 74.  See, e.g., Andrew Chung, U.S. Jury Says Motorola Infringed One 
Intellectual Ventures Patent, REUTERS (Mar. 25, 2015, 6:20 PM), http://www. 
reuters.com/article/2015/03/25/us-usa-motorola-patent-verdict-
idUSKBN0ML2NS20150325; see also Michael Blanding, Bringing Patent 
Trolls into the Light, FORBES (Aug. 20, 2014, 11:10 AM), http://www.forbes. 
com/sites/hbsworkingknowledge/2014/08/20/bringing-patent-trolls-into-the-
light/. 
 75.  See COMM. ON INTELL. PROP. RIGHTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECON., 
Stephen A. Merrill, Richard C. Levin & Mark B. Myers eds., A PATENT 
SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 95 (2004) [hereinafter A PATENT SYSTEM]; see 
also Paul M. Mersino, Note, Patents, Trolls, and Personal Property: Will eBay 
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only source of monetary harm to companies; in fact, it has been 
argued that the troll problem does not necessarily stem from 
abusive litigation tactics.76  Patent trolls are the estimated cause 
of $29 billion leached from defendant-companies per annum “in 
direct out-of pocket costs,” and, “in aggregate, patent litigation 
destroys over $60 billion in firm wealth each year.”77  Shockingly, 
this number may actually be a conservative estimate because it 
only includes “legal fees going to lawyers, and the licensing fees 
paid in tribute to make the trolls go away,” and, moreover, “[t]he 
findings come from a relatively small sample of 83 companies, 
both small and large.”78  As R&D is the precursor to innovation, 
the leaching of budgetary funds from R&D directly undercuts the 
driving purpose of the patent system.  For large technology firms, 
the costs of defending patent troll suits divert huge R&D 
expenditures; in fact, “[i]n 2011, Apple and Google spent more 
money on patent litigation and defensive patent acquisitions than 
on research and development.”79  In contrast, the cost to an 
 
Auction Away a Patent Holder’s Right to Exclude?, 6 AVE MARIA L. REV. 307, 
316 (2007). 
 76.  JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 3 (2008).  However, the 
numbers stated should be received with caution, as some economists disagree 
as to whether they accurately reflect an unbiased examination of the patent 
trolling problem.  Compare James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct 
Costs From NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 387, 412 (2014) (“Given the 
explosion of NPE patent litigation, it is difficult to pin down precisely the 
direct costs to defendants, but we believe that the $29 billion annual 
figure . . . is a plausible estimate; the true number could be higher or lower.”), 
with David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing 
Entities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 455 (2014) (“Bessen 
and Meurer’s study provides some new data for discussion.  However, 
limitations in the data suggest to us that their findings should be viewed 
skeptically, as an outer boundary of the costs of NPE litigation, and one that 
is likely to be substantially overstated.”).  See also Joff Wild, Blog, 
Deconstructing Bessen and Meurer – Paper Raises Big Questions over Their 
NPE Claims, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. (Jul. 27, 2012), http://www.iam-media.com 
/Blog/Detail.aspx?g=454c1adc-52c3-4c2d-8981-e4716361f219. 
 77.  James Bessen, The Evidence Is in: Patent Trolls Do Hurt Innovation, 
HARV. BUS. REV., Nov. 2014, available at https://www.hbr.org/2014/07/the-
evidence-is-in-patent-trolls-do-hurt-innovation. 
 78.  Joe Mullin, New Study, Same Authors: Patent Trolls Cost Economy 
$29 Billion Yearly, ARS TECHNICA (July 3, 2012, 10:11 AM), http://www.ars 
technica.com/tech-policy/2012/07/new-study-same-authors-patent-trolls-cost-
economy-29-billion-yearly/ [hereinafter New Study]. 
 79.  Sam Gustin, Viewpoint: Obama’s ‘Patent Troll’ Reform: Why 
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unsuccessful patent troll is minimal because patent trolls’ 
attorneys usually work on a contingency fee basis.80  Additionally, 
trolls do not have to divert R&D funds to their litigation budget 
because they do not make any products.81  Thus, the common 
solution put forth in reform efforts usually involves fee shifting.82  
However, such “downstream” solutions are not likely to fix the 
problem of patent trolling.83 
II. RECENT REFORM EFFORTS ARE INSUFFICIENT 
As discussed, patent trolling is stifling American innovation 
by sucking money directly from R&D budgets.  In this light, it is 
not surprising that the common reform efforts have targeted 
remedies in order to balance out budgetary misbalances.  Through 
the patent-troll-lawsuit-continuum, remedies can be considered 
“downstream” because a settlement or judgment is typically the 
end of the line for many cases.  “Upstream” activities, on the other 
hand, normally occur before litigation is even conceived; for 
example, the application and prosecution of the patent.  These 
upstream areas typically do not involve the patent troll because, 
as discussed, patent trolls buy patent rights much later down the 
road—after the patent has already been approved by the USPTO, 
and perhaps even practiced for a period of time thereafter.84  The 
difficulties in patent reform can be summed up succinctly as 
follows.  How do we curb patent troll activities (i.e., abusive 
litigation and enveloped threats) without foreclosing the patent 
system to inventors who do not wish to abuse it (i.e., people who 
actually make something useful for society)?  Furthermore, can we 
 
Everyone Should Care, TIME (June 8, 2013), http://www.business.time.com/ 
2013/06/08/viewpoint-obamas-patent-troll-reform-why-everyone-should-care/.   
 80.  See WATKINS, supra note 2, at 15–16 (stating that contingency fees 
commonly range as high as 45%). 
 81.  See WATKINS, supra note 2, at 15.  
 82.  See, e.g., Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. 
Ct. 1749, 1756 (2014) (giving district courts more discretion in awarding 
attorney’s fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285); Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health 
Mgmt. Sys., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1749 (2014) (requiring the Federal Circuit to be 
more deferential to district courts in awarding attorney’s fees under 35 
U.S.C. § 285); Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. § 3 (2013). 
 83.  See Gene Quinn, Fee-shifting Won’t Do Anything to Stop Patent 
Trolls, IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/03/03/ 
fee-shifting-wont-do-anything-to-stop-patent-trolls/ [hereinafter Fee-Shifting]. 
 84.  See Chan & Fawcett, supra note 5, at 2. 
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target upstream activities at all without offending the 
Constitution? 
A. Setting up Downstream 
Recent reforms that have focused on curbing patent trolls 
once litigation has already commenced have been met with mixed 
reviews.85  Rather than focusing on remedies and their associated 
procedural aspects, it may be better to focus on the upstream 
activities before the patent is granted.  By preventing the patent 
from being eligible or patentable in the first place, a patent troll 
cannot obtain broadly worded or ambiguous patents to use as 
weapons.  While this would foreclose the patent system for those 
who do not wish to abuse their patent rights to some extent, it 
would reinforce the constitutional goal of promoting innovation by 
disarming trolls and favoring only strong patents. 
The judiciary has been toiling with this problem for centuries.  
Perhaps the most powerful recognition was that of Justice Bradley 
over 130 years ago in Atlantic Works v. Brady.86  The patent at 
issue covered a dredging boat that utilized a pump, a mud-fan, 
and a series of tanks that, to keep the vessel level, would fill with 
water based on the depth below.87  This process was reversible by 
the pump, which could remove water from the watertight 
compartments depending on the mud-flap’s depth 
measurements.88  The plaintiff-owner of the patent filed an 
infringement suit against Atlantic Works, a builder of boats that 
functioned in approximately the same manner but used a different 
mode of operation.89  The defendant challenged the patent’s 
validity on the grounds of invention90 and novelty, arguing that 
 
 85.  See, e.g., Fee-Shifting, supra note 83. 
 86.  107 U.S. 192 (1883). 
 87.  Id. at 193–94. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. at 194–99. 
 90.  “Invention,” or lack thereof, is an outdated doctrine that is hardly 
applied by the courts when examining validity, mainly due to the subsequent 
amendments to the Patent Act since Atlantic Works, and the difficulty in 
maintaining such a standard; as the Supreme Court stated in 1841: 
The truth is, the word cannot be defined in such manner as to afford 
any substantial aid in determining whether a particular device 
involves an exercise of the inventive faculty or not.  In a given case 
we may be able to say that there is present invention of a very high 
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“the principle of said dredge-boat[] had been substantially known 
and publically used before.”91  Justice Bradley agreed with the 
defendant, opining that patents were not designed to grant a 
monopoly for “every slight advance made.”92 
What do dredging boats have to do with modern-day patent 
trolls suing large corporations?  First, they can both be, at least 
hypothetically, found under bridges.  Second, and more 
importantly, they both have a connection to the struggles involved 
with reforming patent law.  In denying the validity of the patent, 
Justice Bradley succinctly added: 
The design of the patent laws is to reward those who 
make some substantial discovery or invention, which 
adds to our knowledge and makes a step in advance in 
the useful arts.  Such inventors are worthy of all favor.  It 
was never the object of those laws to grant a monopoly for 
every trifling device, every shadow of a shade of an idea, 
which would naturally and spontaneously occur to any 
skilled mechanic or operator in the ordinary progress of 
manufactures.  Such an indiscriminate creation of 
exclusive privileges tends rather to obstruct than to 
stimulate invention.  It creates a class of speculative 
schemers who make it their business to watch the 
advancing wave of improvement, and gather its foam in 
the form of patented monopolies, which enable them to 
lay a heavy tax upon the industry of the country, without 
contributing anything to the real advancement of the 
arts.  It embarrasses the honest pursuit of business with 
fears and apprehensions of concealed liens and unknown 
liabilities to lawsuits and vexatious accountings for 
 
order.  In another we can see that there is lacking that impalpable 
something which distinguishes invention from simple mechanical 
skill.  Courts, adopting fixed principles as a guide, have by a process 
of exclusion determined that certain variations in old devices do or 
do not involve invention, but whether the variation relied upon in a 
particular case is anything more than ordinary mechanical skill is a 
question which cannot be answered by applying the test of any 
general definition.  
McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 427 (1891).  The Patent Act currently 
defines “invention” as an “invention or discovery.”  35 U.S.C. § 100(a) (2015). 
 91.  Atl. Works, 107 U.S. at 194. 
 92.  Id. at 200. 
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profits made in good faith.93 
Thus, the century-old patent reform problem is a double-
edged sword: incentivizing innovation by granting limited 
monopolies also allows litigants to abuse such monopolies without 
contributing to society.  While the system is willing to grant 
patents to those who increase public knowledge, the current 
structure’s overinclusive nature allows trolls to hold onto 
unpracticed patents and use their exclusive rights to invidiously 
threaten legitimate businesses—the costs of which ultimately fall 
onto the consumer.94 
Because patent trolls mainly cause damage to innovation by 
abusing their patent rights in court, reform efforts try to chip 
away at their litigation practices. This may be the reason why 
recent reforms have addressed the troll problem by discouraging 
litigation; for example, the Court just recently issued unanimous 
decisions aimed towards deterring frivolous patent litigation in 
Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness95 and Highmark 
Inc. v. Allcare Health Management System, Inc.96  The Court in 
both cases focused on the Patent Act’s attorney’s fee provision, 
which allows a district court “in exceptional cases [to] award 
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”97  Since 2005, 
the Federal Circuit had only awarded attorney’s fees when a party 
could show “material inappropriate conduct related to the matter 
in litigation, such as willful infringement, fraud or inequitable 
conduct in procuring the patent, misconduct during litigation, 
vexatious or unjustified litigation, conduct that violates 
 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  See WATKINS, supra note 2 at 15–19; FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO 
PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW 
AND POLICY, ch. 3, at 40–41 (2003) [hereinafter TO PROMOTE INNOVATION], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/promote-innovation-
proper-balance-competition-and-patent-law-and-policy/innovationrpt.pdf. 
 95.  134 S. Ct. 1749, 1755–57 (2014) (reasoning that the Federal Circuit’s 
rigid test for determining whether an “exceptional” case exists in awarding 
attorney’s fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 impermissibly interferes with a district 
court’s discretion; holding that the standard for an “exceptional” case is one 
that sticks out from others due to its frivolous nature). 
 96.  134 S. Ct. 1744, 1747 (2014) (holding that a district court’s decision 
to award attorney’s fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 must be reviewed under an 
abuse of discretion standard). 
 97.  35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012); see also Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1757; 
Highmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1749. 
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Fed.R.Civ.P.11, or like infractions” as “established by clear and 
convincing evidence.”98  The Court rejected this “unduly rigid” 
formulation, and found that the Federal Circuit’s abandonment of 
a “holistic, equitable approach” ten years prior was “inconsistent 
with the text” of the attorney’s fee statute.99  Preferring the 
ordinary meaning of the word “exceptional,” the Court held in 
Octane that awarding attorney’s fees is within the district court’s 
discretion—in other words, when a court reviews the totality of 
the circumstances and determines that the case “simply . . . stands 
out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a 
party’s litigating position” or when the case was litigated in an 
“unreasonable manner.”100  Accordingly, because the district court 
has discretion in this determination, the Court further held in 
Highmark that such a finding is only reviewable under an abuse 
of discretion standard.101 
The Court has tried to set up other downstream barriers by 
easing the ability for an accused infringer to bring an action for 
declaratory judgment. In MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., the 
Court held that a party in an infringement case could still bring 
an action for declaratory judgment to challenge the patent’s 
validity regardless of whether that party was paying royalties to 
the other party in accordance with a licensing agreement.102  The 
Court’s decision was thought to “diminish trolls’ abilit[ies] to use 
legal threats as a means of extracting advantageous licensing 
agreements” because trolls had commonly argued that licensees 
would not pay a licensor fees for an invalid patent.103  Although 
the Court rejected this reasoning, the trolls were still able to get 
around the MedImmune holding by altering their licensing 
agreements in a manner that shields themselves against 
 
 98.  Brooks Furniture Mfg. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1381–
82 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 99.  Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1754–55; Highmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1748; see also 
35 U.S.C. § 285. 
 100.  Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1756. 
 101.  Highmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1749; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012) 
(empowering the Federal Circuit with exclusive jurisdiction over patent 
cases). 
 102.  549 U.S. 118, 137 (2007). 
 103.  Mayergoyz, supra note 24, at 255; see MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 123–
25. 
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declaratory judgments.104  The Court revisited this problem in 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC.105  Adding 
further firepower to the anti-troll arsenal, the Court held that in 
scenarios where a defendant-licensee raises a declaratory 
judgment for noninfringement in response to a plaintiff-licensor’s 
infringement charge, the burden does not shift to the licensee, but 
remains on the plaintiff.106  Thus, MedImmune provides a layer of 
protection for infringement defendants by allowing them to pay 
royalties on a patent without forfeiting their ability to challenge 
the patent’s validity and Medtronic provides a “straightforward, 
undiverted analysis of the burden of proof question”107 in 
responsive noninfringement declaratory judgment actions.  In 
combination, these two decisions facilitate a defendant’s ability to 
challenge a patent in response to an infringement suit. 
In the same year as MedImmune, a unanimous Court in eBay 
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. also came to the aid of infringement 
defendants by making it more difficult for trolls to get injunctive 
relief.108  Rather than automatically enjoining a defendant after a 
finding of infringement, as the Federal Circuit had commonly 
done,109 the Court instead found that injunctions may be granted 
only after weighing the traditional equitable factors.110  While 
 
 104.  See Jennifer L. Collins & Michael A. Cicero, The Impact of 
MedImmune Upon Both Licensing and Litigation, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFF. SOC’Y 748, 750–56 (2007) (offering alternative licensing agreements to 
avoid declaratory judgments). 
 105.  134 S. Ct. 843 (2014). 
 106.  Id. at 846.  
 107.  Ronald Mann, Opinion Analysis: Justices Unimpressed with Federal 
Circuit’s Mastery of Federal Procedure Curriculum, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 23, 
2014, 12:06 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/01/opinion-analysis-justices 
-unimpressed-with-federal-circuits-mastery-of-federal-procedure-curriculum/. 
 108.  See 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006). 
 109.  See, e.g., Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246–47 
(Fed. Cir. 1989) (citing W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 
1275, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1988)) (“It is the general rule that an injunction will 
issue when infringement has been adjudged, absent a sound reason for 
denying it.”). 
 110.  eBay, 547 U.S. at 391 (“According to well-established principles of 
equity, a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor 
test before a court may grant such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) 
that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, 
such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) 
that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and 
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest 
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this certainly would have been an impediment to trolls, the Court 
cut the blow by further holding that the denial of an injunction 
cannot be based on whether or not the plaintiff actually practiced 
the invention, as “traditional equitable principles do not permit 
such broad classifications.”111  The majority rejected the argument 
that an entity’s “lack of commercial activity in practicing [its] 
patents” would nullify any inference of irreparable harm.112 
The inherent difficulties in patent reform were also 
illustrated through the interplay between the eBay majority 
opinion and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence.  The majority fell 
victim to a common argument in support of patent trolls:113 
[S]ome patent holders, such as university researchers or 
self-made inventors, might reasonably prefer to license 
their patents, rather than undertake efforts to secure the 
financing necessary to bring their works to market 
themselves.  Such patent holders may be able to satisfy 
the traditional four-factor test, and we see no basis for 
categorically denying them the opportunity to do so.114 
Recognizing the distinction between NPEs and PAEs, Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence highlighted that the Court’s holding, 
aimed at more palatable NPEs, could aid trolling activities.115  
Notably, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence was also the first official 
 
would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.”). 
 111.  Id. at 393. 
 112.  Id. (quoting MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 
712 (E.D. Va. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 113.  See, e.g., Raymond P. Niro & Paul K. Vickrey, The Patent Troll Myth, 
7 SEDONA CONF. J. 153, 156 (2006); see also WATKINS, supra note 2, at 16 
(“Supporters of NPEs [argue] that trolls actually benefit the system because 
they stand up to large companies that, in the past, could infringe patents 
without repercussions.  An individual inventor or small company, they assert, 
could not afford to take an infringer to court.  Trolls fight for the rights of the 
little guy.  By purchasing the patent, the argument continues, trolls infuse 
capital into small business that can in turn focus on more R&D.  [Trolls] 
assume the risk of enforcing patents, and inventors can focus on 
inventing. . . .  NPE advocates [also] point out that trolls are legitimate 
holders of a piece of property that are entitled under the law to protect their 
property rights.  Just as heirs who had no role in creating or building up 
grandfather’s company have a right to manage or sell the company they 
inherited, so do trolls have a right to license and enforce patents they have 
acquired.” (citations omitted)). 
 114.  eBay, 347 U.S. at 393. 
 115.  See id. at 395–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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condemnation of troll activities from a sitting member of the 
Court: 
An industry has developed in which firms use patents not 
as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, 
primarily for obtaining licensing fees.  For these firms, an 
injunction, and the potentially serious sanctions arising 
from its violation, can be employed as a bargaining tool to 
charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy 
licenses to practice the patent.  When the patented 
invention is but a small component of the product the 
companies seek to produce and the threat of an injunction 
is employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations, 
legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for 
the infringement  and an injunction may not serve the 
public interest. . . . The potential vagueness and suspect 
validity of some of these patents may affect the calculus 
under the four-factor test.116 
Justice Kennedy’s skepticism has yet to lose its basis in 
reality.117  However, the eBay case has been marginally successful 
in curbing patent troll activities because it removed the 
permanent injunction remedy from the trolls’ arsenal.118 
The Court has also sought to make life harder for patent trolls 
in the area of inducing infringement.  In Limelight Networks, Inc. 
v. Akamai Technologies, Inc.  A unanimous Court held that 
defendants cannot be liable for inducing infringement when there 
 
 116.  Id. at 396–97 (citations omitted).  Since this case, the Court has 
continued to address the issue of patent trolling directly.  See Commil USA, 
LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1930–31 (2015).  While Commil did 
end up “increas[ing] the in terrorem power of patent trolls,” at least it is now 
apparent that the Court is unified in recognizing patent trolls as a legitimate 
issue.  Id. at 1932 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see id. at 1930–31 (majority 
opinion).  Curiously, before Justice Scalia’s dissent in Commil, the Court had 
never used the term “patent troll” in an opinion.  See Jeff John Roberts, 
Supreme Court Says “Patent Troll” for First Time in Cisco ruling, FORTUNE 
(May 26, 2015, 4:40 PM), http://www.fortune.com/2015/05/26/scotus-cisco-
patent-trolls/. 
 117.  See, e.g., Commil, 135 S. Ct. at 1930–31 (majority opinion); id. at 
1932 (Scalia, J. dissenting). 
 118.  See, e.g., Lim, supra note 7, at 57 (“[N]on-practicing entities [have] 
had a much harder time post-eBay, with requests for injunctions denied up to 
90 percent of the time.”). 
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has been no direct infringement.119  Prior to this case, the Federal 
Circuit had reasoned that because “direct infringement can exist 
independently” from other forms of infringement under section 
271 of the Patent Act,120 one could be potentially liable for 
inducing infringement absent a finding of direct infringement.121  
In perhaps its most condescending opinion directed towards the 
Federal Circuit to date, the Court overturned the appellate court’s 
“fundamental[] misunderstand[ing]” of inducement, making it 
more difficult to prove induced infringement.122  This, in turn, 
reduces a patent troll’s likelihood of winning at an appellate level 
under multiple theories of liability.123 
However, the Court’s recent patronization of the Federal 
Circuit, as highlighted by Octane, Medtronic, and Limelight, may 
have negative consequences that could benefit patent trolls.  
Granting the district courts more discretion allows courts like the 
Eastern District of Texas more room to operate in favor of patent 
trolls.124  This is exemplified through the Teva Pharmaceuticals 
USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc. decision from early 2015, which added 
more power to district courts by holding that subsidiary findings 
of fact are within the sound discretion of the district court 
judge.125  Thus, when both parties put on expert witnesses to 
 
 119.  134 S. Ct. 2111, 2115 (2014). 
 120.  Important for this analysis are the first two subsections: 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without 
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, 
within the United States or imports into the United States any 
patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes 
the patent. 
(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable 
as an infringer. 
35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012). 
 121.  See Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, 692 F.3d 1301, 
1308–09 (Fed. Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2116–17 (2014) (“Requiring 
proof that there has been direct infringement as a predicate for induced 
infringement is not the same as requiring proof that a single party would be 
liable as a direct infringer.”); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271. 
 122.  See Limelight Networks, 134 S. Ct. at 2117.  See also Diane Bartz & 
Lawrence Hurley, U.S. Supreme Court Rulings May Make Life Harder for 
Patent Trolls, REUTERS (June 2, 2014, 5:27 PM), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2014/06/02/us-biosig-nautilus-patent-idUSKBN0ED1M320140602. 
 123.  Bartz & Hurley, supra note 122.  
 124.  Cf. WATKINS, supra note 2, at 23–24. 
 125.  135 S. Ct. 831, 835 (2015). 
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dispute the technical definition of the term “molecular weight,”126 
the district court judge had the discretion to pick which expert to 
go with, and such decision is now reversible only if clearly 
erroneous.127  In holding so, the Court in Teva sought to align 
subsidiary fact-findings within the context of claim construction 
with the findings of fact under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
52(a)(6).128  Prior to this ruling, the Federal Circuit had reviewed 
such findings of subsidiary fact de novo,129 reasoning that “[c]laim 
construction is a legal statement of the scope of the patent right,” 
and the necessary subsidiary fact finding was therefore more akin 
to questions of law.130  The Supreme Court disagreed with the 
Federal Circuit’s reasoning, but additionally held that the 
ultimate determination of a legal question (in Teva, whether the 
claim was indefinite), which has its basis in the subsidiary facts, is 
still reviewable under the heightened de novo standard.131  
Regardless, by failing to endorse the view that subsidiary fact-
 
 126.  In Teva, the Sandoz argued that the term rendered the patent 
invalid for reasons of indefiniteness, as “molecular weight” could mean (1) 
“molecular weight as calculated by the weight of the molecule that is most 
prevalent in the mix that makes up [the drug’s active ingredient],” (i.e. “peak 
average molecular weight”),  (2) “molecular weight as calculated by taking all 
the different-sized molecules in the mix that makes up [the drug’s active 
ingredient] and calculating the average weight” (i.e. “number average 
molecular weight”) or (3) “molecular weight as calculated by taking all the 
different sized molecules in the mix that makes up [the drug’s active 
ingredient] and calculating their average weight while giving heavier 
molecules a weight-related bonus when doing so” (i.e. “weight average 
molecular weight”), all of which were commonly used in the industry.  Id. at 
836. 
 127.  Id. at 835; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (stating that appellate 
courts “must not set aside” the district court’s “[f]indings of fact” unless 
“clearly erroneous”). 
 128.  See Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 837–38. 
 129.  See, e.g., Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. 
Corp., 744 F.3d 1272, 1276–77 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc); Cybor Corp. v. FAS 
Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 130.  Lighting Ballast, 744 F.3d at 1284. 
 131.  Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 841.  But see Insite Vision Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 783 
F.3d 853, 861 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (deferring to district court’s determination of 
facts underlying the ultimate legal question of nonobviousness as articulated 
by expert witnesses resulted in deferring to the district court’s legal 
conclusion of obviousness); Cadence Pharm. Inc. v. Exela PharmSci Inc., 780 
F.3d 1364, 1368–69 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (deferring to district court’s findings of 
subsidiary facts left less room for the Federal Circuit court to make its own 
determination of nonobviousness). 
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finding—which can define the scope of a patent’s claim—is better 
discerned by knowledgeable appellate scrutiny of the record and 
its associated extrinsic materials, rather than a district court 
judge’s opinion, the Court inherently granted more power to 
district courts like the Eastern District of Texas.132 
These downstream reform efforts will not likely curb patent 
abuse because they are only focused on deterring litigation.  It is 
still cheaper for a defendant to settle with a patent troll than to 
spend money on discovery and risk a multi-million dollar 
judgment.133  Keeping the patents out of trolls’ hands will further 
deter litigation, which will have the added benefit of minimizing 
trolls’ patent portfolios.  Fortunately, we have already seen the 
Court attempt to limit the access to the patent system, and while 
these efforts are not necessarily directed towards patent trolls per 
se, the trolls will suffer the most loss from such decisions.134  
However, more needs to be done because there is still enough 
room left for trolls to change their strategy and abuse other 
vulnerable areas of the patent system. 
B. Patent Troll Response: Avoid Litigation, Increase Threats 
While discouraging litigation is certainly a priority, a problem 
associated with patent trolls does not necessarily arise from 
litigation to begin with.135  As discussed, trolls suck away at a 
company’s R&D budget through litigation, but the numbers 
mentioned earlier may actually be an underestimation.136  It is 
inherently more economical for a defendant to settle with a 
patent-troll-plaintiff than to litigate, and settlement amounts are 
often subject to nondisclosure agreements, which keep them out of 
the ultimate tally.137  Lawsuits often cost millions to defend, while 
“[t]he median amount spent to pay off a troll suit is just $230,000 
 
 132.  Cf. Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 851 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 133.  See Blanding, supra note 74 (“Patent trolls bank that, in some cases, 
companies will settle rather than pay the time and monetary costs of fighting 
infringement lawsuits.”). 
 134.  See James Bessen, What the Courts Did to Curb Patent Trolling—for 
Now, ATLANTIC (Dec. 1, 2014, 12:11 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
business/archive/2014/12/what-the-courts-did-to-curb-patent-trollingfor-now/ 
383138/ [hereinafter What the Courts Did to Curb Patent Trolling]. 
 135.  See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 76, at 3. 
 136.  See id. 
 137.  See New Study, supra note 78. 
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for large companies and $180,000 for small- and medium-size 
defendants.”138  Furthermore, “very few strong entities in the 
patent-trolling business are able to pull off giant multimillion-
dollar settlements,” so trolls often prefer to settle as well.139  
Therefore, if troll settlements were included in the figures, the 
numbers would be much higher, especially because both sides 
have an incentive to settle. 
Thus, an unaddressed harm comes from the extortion of 
businesses, both small and large, outside of litigation.  Patent 
trolls are responsible for roughly 60% of patent infringement 
litigation,140 and defendants that prefer to settle still end up 
losing huge sums of money: it is believed that settlements with 
trolls cost large companies roughly 10% of the average R&D 
budget annually,141 and costs small- to medium-sized companies 
37% of their direct costs.142  It seems that the only way to stop the 
threats and the resulting settlements is to disarm the trolls of 
their patents, because it is apparent that the problem arises from 
the ability of patent trolls to obtain ambiguous patents in the first 
place. 
The Court recently attempted to reform upstream activities in 
a way that may prevent trolls from getting their hands in the 
honey pot.  In addressing the question of indefiniteness, in 2014, 
the Court unanimously held, in Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig 
Instruments, Inc., that “a patent is invalid for indefiniteness if its 
claims, read in light of the patent’s specification delineating the 
patent and prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable 
certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the 
invention.”143  While some argue that the Nautilus decision will 
hurt patent trolls because, “[h]istorically speaking, the patents 
 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  See id. 
 141.  John Chambers & Myron E. Ullman, Stopping the Economy-Sapping 
Patent Trolls, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 16, 2015, 7:36 PM), http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/john-chambers-and-myron-ullman-stopping-the-economy-sapping-
patent-trolls-1424133369. 
 142.  See Rebecca J. Rosen, Study: Patent Trolls Cost Companies $29 
Billion Last Year, ATLANTIC (June 29, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
technology/archive/2012/06/study-patent-trolls-cost-companies-29-billion-last-
year/259070/. 
 143.  134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014) 
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that are often asserted by patent trolls” would be weeded out by a 
knowledgeable patent examiner,144  this standard has proven 
more-problematic-than-not in the patentability analysis.145 
Additionally, in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International,146 the 
Court effectively blocked “the most egregious cases of patent 
trolling” by making it more difficult for patent trolls to obtain 
process patents.147  The unanimous Alice Court held that when 
process patents are directed towards an abstract idea, “merely 
requiring generic computer implementation fails to transform that 
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”148   
 For the uninitiated, products149 and processes150 are eligible 
 
 144.  Bartz & Hurley, supra note 122 (quoting the statement of James R. 
Barney, partner at Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP). 
 145.  See infra Part III.B. 
 146.  134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
 147.  Klint Finley, The Patent Wars May Be Cooling, but They’re Far from 
Over, WIRED (Feb. 19, 2015, 1:04 AM), http://www.wired.com/2015/02/patent-
wars-may-cooling-theyre-far/.  
 148.  Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2352.  Reinforcing the “Mayo framework” for 
determining subject matter eligibility for patents directed towards the 
judicial exceptions, the Court articulated the test: 
First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one 
of those patent-ineligible concepts.  If so, we then ask, “[w]hat else is 
there in the claims before us?”  To answer that question, we consider 
the elements of each claim both individually and “as an ordered 
combination” to determine whether the additional elements 
“transform the nature of the claim” into a patent-eligible application.  
We have described step two of this analysis as a search for an 
“inventive concept”—i.e., an element or combination of elements that 
is “sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to 
significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.” 
Id. at 2355 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Mayo 
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294, 1296–
98 (2012)). 
 149.  As typically used, a patent for a “product” means that the subject 
matter of the patent is a “machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”  
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).  The Court has refused to read a narrow definition 
into these divisions, especially when the legislature intentionally left them 
broadly interpreted:  
[T]his Court has read the term “manufacture” in § 101 in accordance 
with its dictionary definition to mean “the production of articles for 
use from raw or prepared materials by giving to these materials new 
forms, qualities, properties, or combinations, whether by hand-labor 
or by machinery.”  Similarly, “composition of matter” has been 
construed consistent with its common usage to include “all 
compositions of two or more substances and . . . all composite 
articles, whether they be the results of chemical union, or of 
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for patent protection,151 but there are three judicially created 
caveats: abstract ideas,152 natural phenomena,153 and laws of 
natures,154 are not eligible for patent protection.155  These 
exceptions are often justified on a theory of pre-emption; the 
“monopolization of [abstract ideas, natural phenomena, and laws 
of nature] through the grant of a patent might tend to impede 
innovation more than it would tend to promote it.”156 
While not directly aimed towards patent trolls, the Alice 
decision presents a threat to entities that typically acquire 
computer-based process and business method patents that are 
worded broadly enough to encompass an abstract idea.157  Alice 
has helped put a dent in these specific areas by expressly 
recognizing that no “inventive concept” exists in patents that 
merely state an abstract idea and then “add[] the words: ‘apply it’ 
on a computer,” thereby invalidating patents that trolls 
 
mechanical mixture, or whether they be gasses, fluids, powders, or 
solids.”   
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (citations omitted) 
(omissions in original) (first quoting Am. Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 
283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931); then quoting Shell Dev. Co. v. Watson, 149 F. Supp. 
279, 280 (D.C. 1957)). 
 150.  “Process,” unlike the products mentioned, is actually defined by the 
Patent Act to mean a “process, art, or method, and includes a new use of a 
known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material.”  
35 U.S.C. § 100. 
 151.  Section 101 of the Patent Act provides that “[w]hoever invents or 
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition 
of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent 
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”  35 U.S.C. § 
101. 
 152.  See, e.g., Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358–60; Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1297–98 
(2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 610–11 (2010); Parker v. Flook, 437 
U.S. 584, 589–90 (1978). 
 153.  See, e.g., Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297–98; Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 
U.S. 63, 67–68 (1972); Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 
U.S. 86, 91 (1939); The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1, 67–69 (1887); O’Reilly v. 
Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 113 (1853). 
 154.  See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 
S. Ct. 2107, 2117 (2013); Diamond, 447 U.S. at 309; Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. 
Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948). 
 155.  See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2352, 2354. 
 156.  Mayo, 134 S. Ct. at 1293. 
 157.  See Daniel Nazer, Big Patent Reform Wins in Court, Defeat (for Now) 
in Congress: 2014 in Review, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 25, 2014), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/12/2014-review-big-patent-reform-wins-
court-defeat-now-congress. 
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notoriously hold.158  The natural consequence of the Alice decision 
has been the steady denial of claims containing abstract ideas, 
namely business method patents and software patents.159  This 
wave of denials is important: by rejecting the patents disfavored 
by Alice, trolls will not be able to purchase and abuse such patents 
down the road.   
Patent trolls now face a threat in the wake of Alice because if 
a troll with a broad patent sues for infringement, a defendant can, 
in response, bring a declaratory judgment for both 
noninfringement (where it is clear that trolls would still hold the 
burden of persuasion160) and for nonvalidity (regardless of the 
payment of royalty fees under a licensing deal), which could result 
in a troll’s abstractly worded patent being thrown out.161  
Additionally, trolls will no longer have the “incentive to acquire 
vague, overreaching patents”162 because those patents will now 
likely be invalid if challenged.  In response, many trolling entities 
will need to switch up their strategy.  Those with ambiguously 
worded patents will likely stray from litigation to avoid the threat 
of invalidation under Alice, and trolls with less-broadly-worded 
patents may avoid litigation in fear of the Octane attorney’s fee 
holding.163  Going forward, however, it is imperative that the 
Court further disarm patent-troll-plaintiffs because the Alice 
decision may not threaten many troll patents, and Octane will not 
likely prevent threatening letters from travelling through the 
mail. 
III.  CLOSING THE DOOR ON PATENT TROLLS 
The Court’s June 2014 decision in Alice continues to ring as 
the USPTO, the courts, and patent holders readjust to new 
 
 158.  134 S. Ct. at 2357; see also Nazer, supra note 157. 
 159.  See, e.g., Gene Quinn, A Software Patent Setback: Alice v. CLS Bank, 
IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 9, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/01/09/a-soft 
ware-patent-setback-alice-v-cls-bank/ [hereinafter Software Patent Setback] 
(“Based on this decision it is hard to see how any software patent claims 
written in method form can survive challenge.”).  
 160.  See Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 
843 (2014). 
 161.  See Finley, supra note 147. 
 162.  See WATKINS, supra note 2, at 17 (quoting James Bessen et. al, The 
Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls, REGULATION, Winter 2011–2012, at 
35, 35) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Finley, supra note 147. 
 163.  See What the Courts Did to Curb Patent Trolling, supra note 134. 
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examination guidelines,164 analytical frameworks,165 and 
developmental setbacks166 respectively.  Going forward, trolls 
with weak patents may avoid litigation because of the invalidation 
threat Alice presents, and the trolls that are not threatened by 
Alice may need to shift their tactics to avoid litigation in light of 
Octane’s holding.  The natural consequence will not be what many 
wish—that the will trolls tuck their tails between their legs and 
run away—but, rather, trolls will likely find another “grey area” to 
attack.  Two of the three analyses involved in determining 
patentability—novelty and nonobviousness—currently supply 
nefarious plaintiffs with such grey areas.  By using these flawed 
analyses to threaten defendants behind closed doors, trolls can 
avoid litigation while continuing to extort defendants into settling. 
A. Encouraging Narrowly Tailored Claims 
Trolls specifically obtain software and business method 
patents that are broadly worded and overly vague, oftentimes 
merely instructing a computer to implement a process involving 
an abstract idea.167  Narrowing the area of subject matter 
eligibility has helped decrease the number of potentially abusive 
patents in the system168 because such patents are not permissible 
under Alice.169  However, not all troll patents will be invalid 
under Alice because not all troll patents will flounder if 
challenged.170   
Due to this, more needs to be done to disarm the trolls.  
Targeting the novelty inquiry, which is just one step downstream 
from the subject matter eligibility determination (i.e., the subject 
of the Alice decision),171 would further remove ambiguous patents 
 
 164.  See, e.g., 2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter 
Eligibility, 79 Fed. Reg. 74,618, 74,633 (Dec. 16, 2014) (to be codified at 37 
C.F.R. pt. 1); Memorandum from Andrew H. Hirshfeld, Deputy Commissioner 
for Patent Examination Policy, to Patent Examining Corps (June 25, 2014), 
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/patents/announce/alice_pec_25jun201
4.pdf. 
 165.  See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 166.  See, e.g., Software Patent Setback, supra note 159. 
 167.  See Nazer, supra note 157. 
 168.  See id. 
 169.  See What the Courts Did to Curb Patent Trolling, supra note 134. 
 170.  See id. 
 171.  See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–102 (2012). 
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from the hands of abusive litigants.  Moreover, narrowing the 
novelty inquiry would actually promote innovation, as it is 
analogous to broadening the scope of the prior art, which is 
believed to promote innovation.  In order to grasp why that is, it is 
important to understand how the process works in further detail. 
The novelty question analyzes the prior art, or, in other 
terms, “everything that an invention can be compared to when 
determining whether the invention is worthy of a patent.”172  In 
analyzing the prior art, the language of the patent at issue is 
important—an invention lacks novelty (i.e., it is “anticipated”) if 
“a single prior art disclosure of all elements of a claimed invention 
[is present as] arranged . . . in the claim.”173  Therefore, trolls with 
broadly worded patents can argue that they rightfully monopolize 
larger portions of the prior art, which makes it more likely that a 
potentially new invention would be anticipated.174  Trolls can also 
utilize the language in their patents to argue that defendants 
have infringed on their exclusive rights.175  Additionally, due to 
the inherency doctrine,176 trolls and other patent holders can even 
 
 172.  M. HENRY HEINES, FIRST TO FILE: PATENTS FOR TODAY’S SCIENTIST AND 
ENGINEER 9 (2014); see also 35 U.S.C. § 102. 
 173.  Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 
1983) (citing Soundscriber Corp. v. United States, 360 F.2d 954, 960 (Ct. Cl. 
1966)); see also Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 
2129 (2014) (“[A]bsent a meaningful definiteness check . . . patent applicants 
face powerful incentives to inject ambiguity into their claims.”).  
Furthermore, under the all-elements-in-a-single-reference-rule: 
[U]nless a reference discloses within the four corners of the 
document not only all of the limitations claimed but also all of the 
limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited in the 
claim, it cannot be said to prove prior invention of the thing claimed 
and, thus, cannot anticipate [the invention].   
Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 174.  See Grab, supra note 25, at 98. 
 175.  See id. at 109. 
 176.  See, e.g., Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco, Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1346, 1347 
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (“‘To anticipate a claim, a prior art reference must disclose 
every limitation of the claimed invention, either explicitly or inherently.’ . . .  
In other words, if granting patent protection on the disputed claim would 
allow the patentee to exclude the public from practicing the prior art, then 
that claim is anticipated, regardless of whether it also covers subject matter 
not in the prior art. . . . Under the principles of inherency, if the prior art 
necessarily functions in accordance with, or includes, the claimed limitations, 
it anticipates.” (citations omitted) (quoting In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 
1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
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argue that their patents cover areas of the art that are not even 
explicitly disclosed in their patent claims.177  In these ways, trolls 
deter innovation by obtaining “weak patents [that] clog up the 
system.”178  However, by narrowing and further defining the 
novelty analysis, and by foreclosing the inherency doctrine, 
broadly worded patents would cover less prior art, leaving less of 
the art available for trolls to claim.179  Trolls would only obtain 
patents that cover more targeted areas of the prior art, it would 
also leave more areas available for patenting by good faith 
innovators, thereby unclogging the prior art and incentivizing 
innovation.  A comparison might be needed, and, luckily, a recent 
statutory enactment has shown to be analogous. 
As postulated, the ultimate result of narrowly interpreting 
claims in the novelty inquiry would be to increase innovation.  
Incentivizing innovation was the same goal of the America Invents 
Act (“AIA”),180 which was enacted by Congress in 2011.181  The 
AIA sought to accomplish this goal by broadening the scope of the 
prior art in the novelty analysis.182  By introducing the “first-to-
file rule, which imposes its greatest differences on the ‘prior’ of 
‘prior art,’” the AIA resulted in “more art being ‘prior’ under the 
 
 177.   See id. 
 178.  ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW 37 (2012); see also 
Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014) (“[A] 
patent must be precise enough to afford clear notice of what is claimed, 
thereby ‘appris[ing] the public of what is still open to them.’  Otherwise there 
would be ‘[a] zone of uncertainty which enterprise and experimentation may 
enter only at the risk of infringement claims.’” (second and third alterations 
in original) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (first quoting Markman v. 
Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373 (1996); then quoting United 
Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942)). 
 179.  See Grab, supra note 25, at 108. 
 180.  Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 
(2011) (codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
 181.  See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 40 (2011); see also HEINES, supra 
note 172, at 24.  
 182.  See HEINES, supra note 172, at 11.  However, the AIA does not have 
a retroactive effect, therefore, the relevant prior art will vary based on the 
date of the patent application—while applications filed on March 16, 2013 
and beyond are subject to “prior art defined by the first-to-file rule” (i.e. pre-
AIA prior art standards), those applications filed before March 16, 2013 will 
be compared to the prior art as “defined by the first-to-invent rule” as set out 
in the AIA.  Id. at 10.  To compound the differential treatments further, 
“[c]ertain applications filed after March 16, 2013 will still be subject to the 
first-to-invent rule . . . and some [applications] will be subject to both.”  Id. 
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AIA than pre-AIA.”183  The AIA accomplished this by increasing 
the total number of (1) United States patents and published 
patent applications, (2) published literature, (3) commercial 
activities, and (4) disclosures that are “otherwise available to the 
public” that an applicant’s patent is compared to in the novelty 
determination.184  As a result, fewer inventions are now 
considered novel under the AIA because the pool of the prior art 
was widened.185 
Congress has determined that broadening the pool of the prior 
art, thereby making it more difficult for an invention to be 
considered novel, would incentivize innovation.186  This is evident 
in examining the legislative intent behind the AIA; it is clear that 
the law “remains true to [its] constitutional command,” of 
“promot[ing] innovation by granting inventors temporally limited 
monopolies on their inventions in a manner that ultimately 
benefits the public through the disclosure of the invention to the 
public.”187  Therefore, because the AIA makes it more difficult for 
inventions to be novel by implementing a broader prior art with 
the ultimate purpose of incentivizing innovation, implementing 
other methods that would make it more difficult for inventions to 
be considered novel may also reinforce the purpose of incentivizing 
innovation.  One way to do this is by strengthening the novelty 
inquiry through the judiciary.188 
 
 183.  Id. at 11. Responsively, the nonobviousness requirement only 
changed in an incremental fashion to reflect the broadened scope of the prior 
art.  See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012) (“A patent for a claimed invention may not be 
obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically 
disclosed as set forth in section 102 [(the novelty requirement)], if the 
differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the 
claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective 
filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the 
art to which the claimed invention pertains.”). 
 184.  See 35 U.S.C. § 102. 
 185.  See HEINES, supra note 172, at 11. 
 186.  See generally H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1 (2011). 
 187.  Id. at 38, 40.  
 188.  Tangentially, it is not even clear whether some pre-AIA holdings are 
still applicable after the AIA.  Compare Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon 
Bearing & Auto Parts, 153 F.2d 516, 519 (2d Cir. 1946) (holding that an 
inventor’s secret commercial exploitation of an invention prior to its 
patenting is considered a “public use” under the pre-AIA scope of the prior 
art), and W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1549 (Fed. 
Cir. 1983) (“The nonsecret use of a claimed process in the usual course of 
producing articles for commercial purposes is a public use [under the pre-AIA 
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The current judicial novelty inquiry is similar to the common 
law “four-corners rule” in contracts.  The “all elements in a single 
document rule” requires that a single prior art reference disclose 
all enabling elements,189 either explicitly or inherently, of another 
invention in order for a latter patent to be anticipated.190  
Furthermore, the invention’s “claimed arrangement or 
combination of those elements must also be disclosed, either 
expressly or inherently, in that same prior art reference.”191   
Narrowly tailoring claims to certain arrangements, 
combinations, and ranges has been shown to leave little room for a 
finding of anticipation.192  Such tailoring not only enhances the 
 
scope of the prior art].”), with Examination Guidelines for Implementing the 
First-Inventor-to-File Provisions of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 78 
Fed. Reg. 11,059, 11,062 (Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1) 
(arguing that the statutory edition of “or otherwise available to the public” to 
35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) indicates that secret commercial exploitation of an 
invention prior to patenting does not render the invention as part of the prior 
art and is therefore is not barred from patentability due to lack of novelty), 
and In re Lister, 583 F.3d 1307, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (standing for the 
proposition that in order for a disclosure to be publically accessible, the 
inquiry is “whether it could be located by ‘persons interested and ordinarily 
skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence.’” (quoting 
Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 
2008)).  
 189.  The single prior art reference must “enable one of skill in the field of 
the invention to make and use the claimed invention.”  Merck & Co. v. Teva 
Pharm. USA, Inc., 347 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 190.  See, e.g., Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1325, 
1332 (Fed. Cir. 2010); MEHL/Biophile Int’l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 
1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Celeritas Techs. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 
1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 191.  Therasense, 593 F.3d at 1333; see also In re Cruciferous Sprout Lit., 
301 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“In order to prove that a claim is 
anticipated . . . defendants must present clear and convincing evidence that a 
single prior art reference discloses, either expressly or inherently, each 
limitation of the claim.”); Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 
1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983).  However, the language of the claim does not 
necessarily have to be identical to the prior art reference for it to be 
anticipated.  See, e.g., In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“‘For a 
prior art reference to anticipate in terms of 35 U.S.C. § 102, every element of 
the claimed invention must be identically shown in a single reference.’  These 
elements must be arranged as in the claim under review, but this is not an 
‘ipsissimis verbis’ test.”) (first quoting Diversitech Corp. v. Century Steps, 
Inc., 850 F.2d 675, 677 (Fed. Cir. 1988); then quoting Akzo N.V. v. U.S. Int’l 
Trade Comm’n, 808 F.2d 1471, 1479 & n.11 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). 
 192.  See HEINES, supra note 172, at 84–86; see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. 
Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369 (1938) (“The limits of a patent 
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likeliness of novelty in the patent examination, but also reduces 
the chance it will be overturned when challenged in court.  It will 
also prevent the clogging of the prior art because patents would 
cover a less broad area of the prior art.193  Therefore, narrowly 
tailoring claims would leave more areas, albeit narrow as well, of 
the prior art for good faith innovators to patent, and incentivize 
innovation in such areas.  Moreover, patent trolls would have to 
put more effort into finding multiple patents if they wish to 
monopolize an entire area of the prior art in the future. 
However, the allowance of inherent disclosures subverts the 
current “all elements in a single document” rule because it allows 
for elements not within the document to act as if they were 
increasing the scope of a patent194 to areas not even disclosed to 
the public.195  To fix this broadening feature, inherent disclosures 
should be eliminated.  Allowing inherent disclosures facilitates 
broadly scoped claims, which undermines innovation and 
discourages competition.196  By allowing a patent to cover areas of 
the art not explicitly stated in a patent, the public cannot possibly 
know what areas of the art another inventor lawfully 
monopolizes.197 Discouraging ambiguous patent claims by 
nullifying inherent disclosures would ultimately leave these 
undisclosed areas of the prior art open for the prudent inventor, 
rather than a potential patent troll, to grab onto, with the end 
result of increased innovation. 
To return back to the AIA analogy, incentivizing innovation 
 
must be known for the protection of the patentee, the encouragement of the 
inventive genius of others and the assurance that the subject of the patent 
will be dedicated ultimately to the public.”). 
 193.  Cf. FELDMAN, supra note 178, at 37. 
 194.  See, e.g., Bettcher Indus. Inc. v. Bunzl USA, Inc., 661 F.3d 629, 654 
(Fed. Cir. 2011); Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc. 339 F.3d 1373 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003); MEHL/Biophile, 192 F.3d at 1365.  But see Trintec Indus., Inc. v. 
Top-U.S.A. Corp., 295 F.3d 1292, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Inherency does not 
embrace probabilities or possibilities.”). 
 195.  Cf. HEINES, supra note 172, at 73. 
 196.  Cf. FELDMAN, supra note 178, at 37; HEINES, supra note 172, at 73. 
 197.  Cf. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2128 
(2014) (“Patent claims . . . should be construed from an objective perspective 
of a [skilled artisan], based on what the applicant actually claimed, disclosed, 
and stated during the application process.” (quoting Joshua D. Sarnoff & 
Edward D. Manzo, An Introduction to, Premises of, and Problems with Patent 
Claim Construction, in PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
9 (Edward D. Manzo ed., 2014)). 
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was not its only purpose—“[t]he legislation [was also] designed to 
establish a more efficient and streamlined patent system that 
[would] improve patent quality and limit unnecessary 
counterproductive litigation costs.”198  Congress believes that 
higher quality patents ensure that “the United States . . . 
maintain[s] its competitive edge in a global economy,” and 
encourages narrowly tailored claims to meet such goal by effecting 
a broader prior art, the effects of which are just starting to 
materialize.199  Narrowing the scope of patent claims by 
eliminating areas that facilitate broader claims, such as inherent 
disclosures, would therefore be an effective way to increase overall 
patent quality and encourage competition.200  Increased 
competition would incentivize innovation, and higher patent 
quality would also have the added benefit of increasing efficiency 
at the USPTO.201 
B. The Nonobviousness Definition is Not Obvious 
Another area of patent law that needs guidance is 
nonobviousness.202  The area of nonobviousness has plagued the 
patent community due to its inconsistent application and 
indeterminate standard.203  Adding further insult to injury, juries 
inevitably end up siding with hindsight,204 making “obviousness” 
an inevitable patent killer.  Once obviousness is found, it is nearly 
impossible to convince someone otherwise.205  It has already been 
 
 198.  H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 40 (2011). 
 199.  Id.; see also Pomper, supra note 31. 
 200.  Cf. Atofina v. Great Lakes Chemical Corp., 441 F.3d 991, 999 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006) (“There may be many species encompassed within a genus that are 
not disclosed by a mere disclosure of the genus. On the other hand, a very 
small genus can be a disclosure of each species within the genus.”); In re 
Meyer, 599 F.2d 1026, 1031–32 (Fed. Cir. 1979) (holding that a claim of a 
genus does not mean that the patent claims all species within the genus).  
 201.  See generally U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 2014–2018 
STRATEGIC PLAN (2014) [hereinafter USPTO STRATEGIC PLAN], http://www. 
uspto.gov/about/stratplan/USPTO_2014-2018_Strategic_Plan.pdf. 
 202.  See Gregory N. Mandel, Another Missed Opportunity: The Supreme 
Court’s Failure to Define Nonobviousness or Combat Hindsight Bias in KSR 
v. Teleflex, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 323 (2008) [hereinafter Another Missed 
Opportunity]. 
 203.  See id at 324. 
 204.  See id. at 340. 
 205.  See id. at 336–37. 
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argued that Alice may lead to some trolls avoiding litigation.206  
Further, having a more selective novelty analysis will help unclog 
the system, which will lead to increased innovation and increased 
competition, and may result in less art belonging to trolls.207  In 
addition, with Octane increasing the stakes, others will avoid 
litigation to avoid possible attorney’s fees.208  However, some 
trolls may not fear these reforms—they will not fear invalidation 
under Alice because their patents are strong enough to meet the 
threshold, and they will not fear Octane because a multi-million 
dollar verdict can offset any possible attorney’s fees awarded.  
Moreover, some trolls would not fear a more selective novelty 
inquiry because their patents have already been determined as 
novel.  Furthermore, none of the Court’s recent decisions really 
threaten the trolls’ ability to send letters that extort defendants 
into settlements.  Those who fear litigation may come to realize 
that they can take advantage of the hindsight bias and the 
meaningless nonobviousness standard.  Plaintiff-trolls can 
challenge the validity of their prey’s patent by oversimplifying 
issues to a jury (as they already do209) and use that threat to 
strong-arm defendants into settling outside of court.  Thus, it is of 
the highest priority that the Court steps in to give some shape to 
the flawed nonobviousness standard. 
It is easy to see, just by looking at the statute, how jurors 
have a difficult time understanding nonobviousness.210  Section 
103 of the Patent Act states that an invention is obvious “if the 
differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are 
such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been 
obvious . . . to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which 
the invention pertains.”211  However, the jury is asked for a 
determination of nonobviousness.  Stated another way, in order 
for an invention to be not obvious, jurors must find that a person 
 
 206.  See supra Part II.B. 
 207.  See supra Part III.A. 
 208.  See supra Part II.B. 
 209.  See WATKINS, supra note 2, at 30.  But see In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 
743, 745 (Fed. Cir 1999) (“Inherency, however, may not be established by 
probabilities or possibilities.  The mere fact that a certain thing may result 
from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.” (quoting Cont’l Can Co. v. 
Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264,1269 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). 
 210.  See Another Missed Opportunity, supra note 202, at 335–36. 
 211.  35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
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of ordinary skill in the art would not have thought the invention 
was obvious at the time it was made.212  The double negative is 
only further confused if a jury is instructed that patent ineligible 
inventions are invalid, not-novel inventions are invalid, but not-
obvious inventions are not invalid.213  Additionally, the statute 
also states that “[p]atentability shall not be negatived by the 
manner in which the invention was made.”214  However, the 
statutory language is only the tip of the nonobvious problem, but 
some additional background information may be needed to explain 
why.   
In comparing novelty and nonobviousness, nonobviousness 
raises questions of quality rather than quantity.215  Both analyses 
target the prior art, but nonobviousness posits a different 
question: Would a person having ordinary skill in the field think 
that the particular invention is obvious, when compared to the 
prior art, either because it is an instinctive or miniscule departure 
from previous inventions, or due to the obviousness of combining 
prior art references?216  This inquiry “is thus determined by an 
evaluation of the invention itself, including its properties, 
operability, and utility, not by how much brainstorming, testing, 
or searching the inventor had to go through to arrive at the 
invention.”217  Recently, the Court broadened the nonobviousness 
inquiry in KSR v. Teleflex218 when two or more prior art elements 
are combined, the result of which some commentators have 
described as the Supreme Court’s supreme failure.219  Most novel 
 
 212.  See id.; see also Another Missed Opportunity, supra note 202, at 326. 
 213.  See Another Missed Opportunity, supra note 202, at 325. 
 214.  Id.; see also Richard S. Gruner, Everything Old is New Again: 
Obviousness Limitations on Patenting Computer Updates of Old Designs, 9 
B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 209, 264 (2003); Kimberly A. Moore, Jury Demands: 
Who’s Asking?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 847, 848 (2002). 
 215.  See HEINES, supra note 172, at 87, 89. 
 216.  See 35 U.S.C. § 103; see also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 
398, 406 (2007); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). 
 217.  See HEINES, supra note 172, at 89. 
 218.  550 U.S. 398. 
 219.  See Another Missed Opportunity, supra note 202, at 324; see also 
Jason Brewer, Updating the Patent System’s Novelty Requirement to Promote 
Small-Molecule Medicinal Progress, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1151, 1169 
(2012); Gene Quinn, KSR on the 5th Anniversary: One Supremely Obvious 
Mess, IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 29, 2012), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/04/29/ 
ksr-the-5th-anniversary-one-supremely-obvious-mess/. 
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inventions will face the KSR v. Teleflex standard, as just about 
everything in the present day is a combination of prior art 
elements on some metaphysical level.220 
Currently, the standard for examining nonobviousness 
requires courts to consider the factors laid out in Graham v. John 
Deere Co., which include: (1) the scope and content of the relevant 
prior art; (2) the differences between the disclosed invention and 
the prior art; and (3) the “level of ordinary skill” involved in the 
industry.221  Additionally, the courts may also consider 
oftentimes-irrelevant “secondary factors” such as the invention’s 
“commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of 
others, etc., . . . to give light to the circumstances surrounding the 
origin of the subject matter sought to be patented.”222  This 
analysis is further compounded in light of the Supreme Court’s 
holding in KSR, which stated that a combination of prior art 
references may be obvious if a person having ordinary skill in the 
art may have hypothetically tried it.223 
In KSR, the Court rejected a rigid application of the 
“teaching, suggestion, or motivation” test224 previously utilized by 
the Federal Circuit to determine whether a combination of prior 
art elements was obvious, and instead posed the obviousness 
inquiry in light of the Graham factors: whether the prior art 
disclosures “would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the 
relevant field to combine the elements in the way the claimed new 
invention does.”225  However, the Court never attempted to 
indicate whom a person of “ordinary skill in the art” would be and 
did not direct courts to analyze any specific area of the art.  
Instead, the Court merely claimed that a person of ordinary skill 
in the art is “also a person of ordinary creativity, not an 
automaton.”226  This standard has been inconsistently applied by 
 
 220.  See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418–19. 
 221.  See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. 
 222.  Id.; see also HEINES, supra note 172, at 107. 
 223.  KSR, 550 U.S. at 420. 
 224.  Under this test, the combination of prior art elements “is only proved 
obvious if ‘some motivation or suggestion to combine the prior art teachings’ 
can be found in the prior art, the nature of the problem, or the knowledge of a 
person having ordinary skill in the art.”  Id. at 407 (quoting Al-Site Corp. v. 
VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1323–24 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
 225.  Id. at 418. 
 226.  Id. at 421. 
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the USPTO,227 and has led towards more deference to 
nonobjective hindsight in the courts.228  Moreover, since the KSR 
holding, there has been a steady increase in the total number of 
patents issued and maintained: while just over 150,000 patents 
were issued in 2008, the amount more than doubled to just shy of 
304,000 in 2014.229 
The collective ambiguity is a result of the undefined “person of 
ordinary skill in the art” standard.  To illustrate, if an inventor 
creates a method for administering a topical agent to treat 
bacterial ear infections, is the person of ordinary skill in the prior 
art the doctor who administers the antibacterial agent or a 
researcher with extensive knowledge of creating pharmaceuticals 
to treat such bacterial ear infections?  The Federal Circuit, in 
Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., overturned a district court 
ruling of nonobviousness for this invention that hinged on the 
belief that the person of ordinary skill was that of a person with a 
medical degree; the Federal Circuit, on the other hand, based its 
ruling of obviousness on the belief that inventors in the art 
comprised only “specialists in drug and ear treatments.”230  
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reasoned that an ordinary 
pediatrician would neither have the means nor motivation to 
create the “compound to treat ear infections without damaging a 
 
 227.  See Gregory Mandel, The Non-Obvious Problem: How the 
Indeterminate Nonobviousness Standard Produces Excessive Patent Grants, 
42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 57, 109 (2008) [hereinafter The Non-Obvious Problem]; 
see also ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: 
HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND 
PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT, 32–35, 75, 119–23, 145–49 (2004); A 
PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 75, at 87–95; Carl Shapiro, Patent System 
Reform: Economic Analysis and Critique, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1017, 1018 
(2004). 
 228.  See Another Missed Opportunity, supra note 202, at 340–42. 
 229.  See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, FISCAL YEAR 2014 
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 146 tbl. 6 (2014), http:// 
www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/USPTOFY2014PAR.pdf.  While some may 
attribute this to the increasing demand for patents worldwide, the amount of 
patents the USPTO has issued to residents of foreign countries has not 
increased significantly in the past five years, the only notable exception being 
Japan.  Id. at 151–52 tbl. 10; see also USPTO STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 
201, at 5. 
 230.  501 F.3d 1254, 1256–57 (Fed. Cir. 2007), rev’g 441 F. Supp. 2d 672 
(D. N.J. 2006). 
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patient’s hearing,” and ruled the invention obvious.231  Thus, it is 
apparent that nonobviousness will differ depending on whether 
the person of ordinary skill in the art is one that could conceive 
the invention versus one who could reduce the invention to 
practice in order to fix a problem.232 
The nonobviousness analysis is further complicated based on 
which field of art a court chooses to analyze.  Presumably, the 
ordinary level of skill required for people in sophisticated arts is 
high, while the level of ordinary skill required for those in less 
sophisticated fields is low.233  If the art is very complicated, it 
could even be impossible for an inventor in a sophisticated field to 
meet the threshold because jurors cannot easily place themselves 
in such an inventor’s shoes.234  The same result can occur in areas 
where the art does not require a high level of skill because it is 
easier to “implement a predictable variation” of a previous 
invention within the relevant prior art through “a simple 
mechanical solution.”235  Simply stated, the ultimate result is that 
“[t]oo high a nonobviousness standard reduces the incentives for 
innovators to invent and disclose,” while “[t]oo low a 
nonobviousness standard allows excessive patenting.”236 
In attempting to answer the question of ordinary skill in the 
art, courts oftentimes consider many factors,237 several of which 
are oftentimes unhelpful.  For example, two factors frequently 
considered are: (1) the inventor’s education level, and (2) the level 
of sophistication required in the art.238  Highly sophisticated and 
educated artists are expected to possess a higher level of 
creativity, and, therefore, the bar is set artificially high. 239  On 
 
 231.  Id. at 1257. 
 232.  See The Non-Obvious Problem, supra note 227, at 72–76. 
 233.  See id. at 75–76. 
 234.  See id. at 76. 
 235.  KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007); Izzo Golf, Inc. 
v. King Par Golf Inc., 561 F. Supp. 2d 334, 340 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 236.  The Non-Obvious Problem, supra note 227, at 89. 
 237.  See, e.g., Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696 
(Fed. Cir. 1983) (“Factors that may be considered in determining level of 
ordinary skill in the art include: (1) the educational level of the inventor; (2) 
type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior art solutions to those 
problems; (4) rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) sophistication of 
the technology; and (6) educational level of active workers in the field.”). 
 238.  See id. 
 239.  See The Non-Obvious Problem, supra note 227, at 74–76. 
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the other side of the spectrum, the bar is set artificially low; even 
educated artists in a relatively unsophisticated field can have a 
difficult time convincing a lay jury that their invention was not 
obvious because their art is not sophisticated.240  The result is the 
same in both situations—an obviousness finding.  In one situation, 
jurors will assume a highly intelligent person would have thought 
the invention was obvious because the heightened level of skill 
required in the art requires an inventor to frequently think of 
solutions; in the other, the low sophistication of the art almost 
presumes obviousness.241  Thus, diligent patent trolls that 
recognize this quandary can put the level of ordinary skill in the 
art into controversy to either conflate or simplify the issues.242  
This is particularly dangerous in the realm of patent trolling, 
where infringement plaintiffs often oversimplify legal issues and 
tug on the heartstrings of jurors in eastern Texas.243 
Adding fuel to the fire is the existence of hindsight bias.  The 
nonobviousness inquiry ponders whether the invention would 
have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the 
time it was invented, but “when a patent application or a patent 
comes to an examiner or a court, an invention has [already] been 
achieved and a problem has been solved.”244  Although “a lay 
decision maker can place himself or herself in the mindset of an 
ordinary person . . . lay individuals are generally not cognitively 
capable” of putting themselves in the shoes of an artist with 
ordinary skill at whatever time the invention was made.245   
Sometimes even multiple generations of the invention at issue 
have developed since the patent in question was issued and trolls 
 
 240.  See id. at 75. 
 241.  See id. at 74–76. 
 242.  Cf. Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 
2007) (citing Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 347 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 
2003)) (stating that when the level of ordinary skill in the art is not in 
controversy, the courts will not address the inquiry of ordinary skill).  But see 
Printguard, Inc. v. Anti-Mktg. Sys., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 2d 189, 203 (D. Mass. 
2008) (“[I]t is well-established that in certain situations, such as with 
relatively simple and understandable technology, a specific finding on the 
level of ordinary skill in the art is unnecessary because the prior art itself is 
representative of the relevant level of ordinary skill.”).  
 243.  See WATKINS, supra note 2, at 30–31. 
 244.  Jun Wu, Note, Rewinding Time: Advances in Mitigating Hindsight 
Bias in Patent Obviousness Analysis, 97 KY. L.J. 565, 570 (2009). 
 245.  The Non-Obvious Problem, supra note 227, at 94. 
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that own older patents for obsolete technologies can argue that 
such advancements infringe on their technologically ancient 
patent.246  Alternatively, the same troll-plaintiffs could bring a 
declaratory judgment in order to invalidate their target’s patent 
based on obviousness.  This is likely, considering that some 
downstream barriers set up by the Court to curb patent trolling 
may be ineffective.  These advances are believed to deter 
litigation, which makes the threat of invalidation a more valuable 
weapon for a troll because invalidation can be achieved via several 
methods of internal review.  Therefore, it is imperative that the 
nonobviousness standard gets is thoroughly and clearly defined247 
before further abuse manifests itself in this gaping hole. 
CONCLUSION 
Patent trolls threaten the economy and undermine the 
 
 246.  See, e.g., 2014 in Patent Litigation, supra note 63, at fig. 21. 
 247.  The author currently abstains from providing any suggestion as to 
what this definition might be because scholars with far more experience and 
knowledge in the field have supplied plenty of alternatives.  For example, 
some argue that the test for obviousness should be dependent upon the 
motives for the invention—would the inventor have combined prior art 
elements “but for” the incentives of the patent system?  See TO PROMOTE 
INNOVATION, supra note 94, ch. 4, at 6–8; Robert Merges, Uncertainty and the 
Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 35 (1992).  Others argue for a 
test that bases obviousness on whether the invention was more than a mere 
trivial advance from the prior art.  See Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success 
and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 
803, 812 (1988).  Another alternative is the constitutional standard, which 
seeks to set the nonobviousness standard at a level that would most 
efficiently promote innovation.  See, e.g., Malla Pollack, The Multiple 
Unconstitutionality of Business Method Patents: Common Sense, 
Congressional Consideration, and Constitutional History, 28 RUTGERS 
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 61, 120 (2002).  However, all of these standards have 
fundamental flaws that would result in the same murky uncertainties.  See 
The Non-Obvious Problem, supra note 227, at 84–89.  Arguably the most 
favorable standard would “depend on how probable the invention would have 
been for a person having ordinary skill in the art working on the problem 
that the invention solves.”  Id. at 116.  This is supported by case law and “at 
worst . . . provides no less incentive [to innovate] than the current standard.”  
Id. at 118; see also DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 
F.3d 1314, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Although predictability is a touchstone of 
obviousness, the ‘predictable result’ discussed in KSR refers not only to the 
expectation that prior art elements are capable of being physically combined, 
but also that the combination would have worked for its intended purpose.” 
(quoting KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007))).   
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Constitution by impeding innovation in open court and behind 
closed doors.  Although the Supreme Court has taken steps in 
addressing the troll problem, these will only be temporary fixes.  
While some of the decisions of the past decade will deter trolls 
from litigation because of the threat of invalidation, increased or 
shifted burdens, or attorney’s fees, the strong will still survive and 
continue with their nefarious tactics.  In addressing the patent 
troll epidemic, it is imperative to not merely set up barriers 
downstream focusing on litigation.  A much more effective method 
is to target ambiguous areas before the issue reaches the courts.  
To put a large dent in abusive patent troll activities both inside 
and outside of court, the system must change in a manner that 
keeps patents out of abusive litigants’ hands to begin with.  If 
patent trolls manage to hold broadly scoped patents, the strongest 
remedy would be to increase the scrutiny involved in the 
patentability analysis to make the system more impervious to troll 
tactics.  Trolls will continue to send out threatening letters, and 
until their firepower is reduced, they will continue to remain a 
threat.  Such lasting change must come from the Court because 
other modes have been astoundingly ineffective. 
 
 
